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#### Obama is pushing against new Iran sanctions – failure undermines the interim deal and future negotiations

DeYoung and Warrick 12/1 Karen and Joby, Washington Post, As senators work on Iran sanctions bill, White House lobbies lawmakers not to act, 12/1/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/as-senators-work-on-iran-sanctions-bill-white-house-lobbies-lawmakers-not-to-act/2013/12/01/eb3e9d5a-5927-11e3-835d-e7173847c7cc\_story.html

A bipartisan juggernaut of senior senators is spending the remaining week of the Thanksgiving recess forging agreement on a new sanctions bill that the senators hope to pass before breaking again for Christmas. The administration believes the legislation could scuttle the interim nuclear agreement reached with Iran on Nov. 23 and derail upcoming negotiations on a permanent deal — scheduled for completion in six months — to ensure that Iran will never be able to build a nuclear weapon.¶ “If you want to hold our feet to the fire on the final deal, fine, do that,” a senior administration official said. “If people have concerns about elements of a final agreement, come in and tell us. . . . But that is a separate discussion from passing a sanctions bill in the middle of negotiations.”¶ The administration contends that new sanctions not only would violate the terms of the interim agreement — which temporarily freezes Iran’s nuclear programs and modestly eases existing sanctions — but also could divide the United States from its international negotiating partners across the table from Iran and give the upper hand to Iranian hard-liners in upcoming talks.¶ “The purpose of sanctions from the outset was to create a dynamic so that you can get a change in policy from the Iran­ians,” David Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. said in an interview. “It’s not sanctions for the sake of having sanctions.”¶ The White House has organized a full-court press between now and the Senate’s return Dec. 9 to persuade lawmakers not to act. In addition to briefings for anyone who wants one, Obama, Secretary of State John F. Kerry, national security adviser Susan E. Rice and other top officials are making personal calls. Kerry sent a video to his former Capitol Hill colleagues explaining the deal, “because some people are putting out some misinformation on it.”

#### Engaging Mexico is politically divisive

Wilson 13

Christopher E., Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars , January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, **the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make**: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . **Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action** to support regional exporters morepolitically divisive **than it ought to be.**

#### Obama’s political capital is key – assumes all thumpers

Balakrishnan 12/1 Bhaskar, The Hindu Business Line, Time to end Iran's isolation, 12/1/13, Lexis

When the US Congress meets on December 9, it will no doubt take stock of the situation. Congress is the determining factor in easing general economic sanctions, something Iran desperately seeks, while the US President has powers to provide only limited relief. A Bill on more sanctions has been passed in the House by a huge bipartisan majority (400-22), and a similar Bill in the Senate is under active consideration. Considerable political capital and persuasion will be needed to get the Senate to hold off on more sanctions.¶ The gains¶ Iran has much to gain from a comprehensive agreement with the P5 plus Germany. (P5 refers to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Along with Germany — P5+1 — they are making diplomatic efforts over Iran's nuclear programme.) Lifting the sanctions would provide the benefits of economic growth for its population. The regime would find it easier to manage demands for greater freedom. A civil nuclear programme could grow rapidly. Conventional arms purchases and technology transfers would greatly strengthen the country. Its dominant position in the Gulf and as the leader of Shia Muslims would be recognised. The US and western allies would benefit from Iran's retreat from the nuclear weapons threshold. The nuclear non-proliferation movement would be strengthened and countries that emulate Iran's quest for nuclear weapons capability, discouraged. ¶ The success of diplomacy would stabilise the oil markets and boost world markets. Iran would be a counter to the Taliban-Al Qaeda influence in Afghanistan. ¶ Further, President Rouhani's success could well boost moderate candidates in the 2016 parliamentary elections in Iran.¶ However, Israel and Saudi Arabia oppose the interim agreement. ¶ The way forward¶ The US Congress is a major problem for the Obama administration in getting the sanctions lifted. There is deep suspicion over Iran's intentions, rightwing hostility, and bitter division over domestic issues such as healthcare and government spending. The approaching 2014 congressional election has also cast its shadow. Obama needs to be encouraged to go further by the international community. It is hoped that Iran's leaders will also realise the importance of gaining support from the US Congress.

#### Deal key to prevent war

Shank and Gould 9/12 Michael Shank, Ph.D., is director of foreign policy at the Friends Committee on National Legislation. Kate Gould is legislative associate for Middle East policy at FCNL, No Iran deal, but significant progress in Geneva, 9/12/13, http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/cause-conflict-conclusion/2013/nov/12/no-iran-deal-significant-progress-geneva/

Congress should welcome, not stubbornly dismiss, diplomatic efforts to finalize the interim accord and support the continued conversation to reach a more comprehensive agreement. The sanctions that hawks on the Hill are pushing derail such efforts and increase the prospects of war. ¶ There is, thankfully, a growing bipartisan contingent of Congress who recognizes that more sanctions could undercut the delicate diplomatic efforts underway. Senator Carl Levin, D-Mich., chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, cautioned early on that, “We should not at this time impose additional sanctions.” ¶ Senator Tim Johnson, D-S.D., chair of the Banking Committee, is still weighing whether to press forward with new sanctions in his committee. Separately, as early as next week, the Senate could vote on Iran sanctions amendments during the chamber’s debate on the must-pass annual defense authorization bill.¶ This caution against new sanctions, coming from these more sober quarters of the Senate, echoes the warnings from a wide spectrum of former U.S. military officials against new sanctions. There is broad recognition by U.S. and Israeli security officials that the military option is not the preferred option; a diplomatic one is. ¶ This widespread support for a negotiated solution was highlighted last week when 79 national security heavyweights signed on to a resounding endorsement of the Obama Administration’s latest diplomatic efforts.¶ Any member of Congress rejecting a diplomatic solution moves the United States toward another war in the Middle East. Saying no to this deal-in-the-works, furthermore, brings the world no closer toward the goal of Iran giving up its entire nuclear program. Rather, it would likely result in an unchecked Iranian enrichment program, while the United States and Iran would teeter perilously close on the brink of war. ¶ A deal to prevent war and a nuclear-armed Iran is within reach and it would be dangerous to let it slip away. Congress can do the right thing here, for America’s security and Middle East’s stability, and take the higher diplomatic road. Pandering to harsh rhetoric and campaign contributors is no way to sustain a foreign policy agenda. It will only make America and her assets abroad less secure, not more. The time is now to curb Iran’s enrichment program as well as Congress’s obstructionism to a peaceful path forward.

#### US-Iran war causes global nuclear war and collapses the global economy

Avery 11/6 John Scales, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences.¶ As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems.¶ The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy.¶ In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such a extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result.¶ Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

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#### The United States federal government should condition the Export Import Bank of the United States substantially increase financing for advanced biofuels in Mexico on ending human rights abuses by Mexican forces. The United States federal government should enact a periodic certification process to determine that abuses are effectively investigated and prosecuted.

#### Doing the plan without human rights conditions sends the message that the US condones torture and violence – turns the aff and reinforces organized crime

**WOLA 10** – Washington Office on Latin America (“Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to Human Rights Performance,” 9/14/2010, <http://www.wola.org/publications/congress_withhold_funds_for_mexico_tied_to_human_rights_performance>)//VP

However, research conducted by our respective organizations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and even the State Department’s own reports, demonstrates conclusively that Mexico has failed to meet the four human rights requirements set out by law. As a result, Congress should not release these select Merida funds. Releasing these funds would send the message that the United States condones the grave human rights violations committed in Mexico, including torture, rape, killings, and enforced disappearances.¶ We recognize that Mexico is facing a severe public security crisis, and that the United States can play a constructive role in strengthening Mexico’s ability to confront organized crime in an effective manner. However, human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces are not only deplorable in their own right, but also significantly undermine the effectiveness of Mexico’s public security efforts. Building trust between the Mexican people and the government is essential to gathering information to dismantle organized crime. When security forces commit grave human rights violations and they are not held accountable for their actions, they lose that trust, alienating key allies and leaving civilians in a state of terror and defenselessness. It is thus in the interest of both of our countries to help Mexico curb systematic human rights violations, ensure that violations are effectively investigated and those responsible held accountable, and assess candidly the progress Mexico is making towards improving accountability and transparency. ¶ Evidence demonstrates that Mexico is not fulfilling effectively any of the requirements established by Congress, particularly those dealing with prosecuting military abuses and torture:

#### Conditioning on human rights violators is necessary to uphold a moral order – protecting rights is an a-priori concern

Beversluis, 89 (Eric H. April 1989. “On Shunning Undesirable Regimes: Ethics and Economic Sanctions.” Public Affairs Quarterly, April, vol. 3, no. 2)//VP

A fundamental task of morality is resolving conflicting interests. If we both want the same piece of land, ethics provides a basis for resolving the conflict by identifying "mine" and "thine." If in anger 1 want to smash your face, ethics indicates that your face's being unsmashed is a legitimate interest of yours which takes precedence over my own interest in expressing my rage. Thus ethics identifies the rights of individuals when their interests conflict.

But how can a case for shunning be made on this view of morality? Whose interests (rights) does shunning protect? The shunner may well have to sacrifice his interest, e.g., by foregoing a beneficial trade relationship, but whose rights are thereby protected? In shunning there seem to be no "rights" that are protected. For shunning, as we have seen, does not assume that the resulting cost will change the disapproved behavior. If economic sanctions against South Africa will not bring apartheid to an end, and thus will not help the blacks get their rights, on what grounds might it be a duty to impose such sanctions'? We find the answer when we note that there is another "level" of moral duties. When Galtung speaks of "reinforcing... morality," he has identified a duty that goes beyond specific acts of respecting people's rights. The argument goes like this: There is more involved in respecting the rights of others than not violating them by one's actions. For if there is such a thing as a moral order, which unites people in a moral community, then surely one has a duty (at least prima facie) not only to avoid violating the rights of others with one's actions but also to support that moral order. Consider that the moral order itself contributes significantly to people's rights being respected. It does so by encouraging and reinforcing moral behavior and by discouraging and sanctioning immoral behavior. In this moral community people mutually reinforce each other's moral behavior and thus raise the overall level of morality. Were this moral order to disintegrate, were people to stop reinforcing each other's moral behavior, there would be much more violation of people's rights. Thus to the extent that behavior affects the moral order, it indirectly affects people's rights. And this is where shunning fits in. Certain types of behavior constitute a direct attack on the moral order. When the violation of human rights is flagrant, willful, and persistent, the offender is, as it were, thumbing ~~her~~ nose at the moral order, publicly rejecting it as binding her behavior. Clearly such behavior, if tolerated by society, will weaken and perhaps eventually undermine altogether the moral order. Let us look briefly at those three conditions which turn immoral behavior into an attack on the moral order. An immoral action is flagrant if it is "extremely or deliberately conspicuous; notorious, shocking." Etymologically the word means "burning" or "blazing." The definition of shunning implies therefore that those offenses require shunning which are shameless or indiscreet, which the person makes no effort to hide and no good-faith effort to excuse. Such actions "blaze forth" as an attack on the moral order. But to merit shunning the action must also be, willful and persistent. We do not consider the actions of the "backslider," the weak-willed, the one-time offender to be challenges to the moral order. It is the repeat offender, the unrepentent sinner, the cold-blooded violator of morality whose behavior demands that others publicly reaffirm the moral order. When someone flagrantly, willfully, and repeatedly violates the moral order, those who believe in the moral order, the members of the moral community, must respond in a way that reaffirms the legitimacy of that moral order. How does shunning do this? First, by refusing publicly to have to do with such a person one announces support for the moral order and backs up the announcement with action. This action reinforces the commitment to the moral order both of the shunner and of the other members of the community. (Secretary of State Shultz in effect made this argument in his caB for international sanctions on Libya in the early days of 1986.). Further, shunning may have a moral effect on the shunned person, even if the direct impact is not adequate to change the immoral behavior. If the shunned person thinks of herself as part of the moral community, shunning may well make clear to ~~her~~ that ~~she~~ is, in fact, removing herself from that community by the behavior in question. Thus shunning may achieve by moral suasion what cannot be achieved by "force." Finally, shunning may be a form of punishment, of moral sanction, whose appropriateness depends not on whether it will change the person's behavior, but on whether he deserves the punishment for violating the moral order.

Punishment than can be viewed as a way of maintaining the moral order, of "purifying the community" after it has been made "unclean," as ancient communities might have put it.

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**The aff is not T - the plan is an economic inducement – engagement requires trade promotion**

**Celik, 11 –** master’s student at Uppsala University (Department of Peace and Conflict Research) (Arda, Economic Sanctions and Engagement Policies <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/175204/economic-sanctions-and-engagement-policies>)

Literature of liberal school points out that economic engagement policies are significantly effective tools for sender and target countries. The effectiveness leans on mutual economic and political benefits for both parties.(Garzke et al,2001).Ecenomic engagement operates with trade mechanisms where sender and target country establish intensified trade thus increase the economic interaction over time. This strategy decreases the potential hostilities and provides mutual gains. Paulson Jr (2008) states that this mechanism is highly different from carrots (inducements). Carrots work quid pro quo in short terms and for narrow goals. Economic engagement intends to develop the target country and wants her to be aware of the long term benefits of shared economic goals. Sender does not want to contain nor prevent the target country with different policies. Conversely; sender works deliberately to improve the target countries’ Gdp, trade potential, export-import ratios and national income. Sender acts in purpose to reach important goals. First it establishes strong economic ties because economic integration has the capacity to change the political choices and behaviour of target country. Sender state believes in that economic linkages have political transformation potential.(Kroll,1993)

**C. Voting issue –**

**1. limits – broad interpretations of engagement include anything that effects the economy, which means everything**

**2. negative ground – trade promotion is vital for a** stable mechanism **for disad links and counterplan ground**

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**Biofuels policy is inherently neoliberal—discourse places it at the top of the sustainability hierarchy—its intent is to colonize the global South through land extraction**

**Pellizzioni 12**—Associate Professor of Environmental and Political Sociology at the University of Trieste, Italy [Luigi, & Marja Ylönen, Published in, Neoliberalism and Technoscience: Critical Assessments, Ashgate, 2012, Chapter 7 “Neoliberalising technoscience and environment: EU policy for competitive, sustainable biofuels” Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Kean Birch, http://oro.open.ac.uk/33379/1/LLTPKB\_EU\_biofuel\_policy\_NeoliberalismTechoscience\_2012.pdf)//VP

Techno-fixes for resource conflicts The tendency towards plunder is disguised, or even reversed, by a hegemonic neoliberal discourse. According to its promises, greater productive efficiency reduces the need for resources and so helps to conserve them. In a circular logic, market competition becomes an environmental saviour by stimulating gains in efficiency and thus sustainability. Environmentalism has been incorporated into models of market progress: this ‘has done far more to smooth the “roll-out” of neoliberalizations than attempts to dismiss or reject environmental concerns outright’ (McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 279). To address sustainability problems, the extension of markets has been linked with a technological fix, whose development ‘relies on the coercive powers of competition’. This ‘becomes so deeply embedded in entrepreneurial common sense, however, that it becomes a fetish belief that there is a technological fix for each and every problem’ (Harvey 2005: 68). Such expectations frame sustainability problems as a technical inefficiency, to be overcome by technoscientific innovation. Technoscientific innovations have been celebrated for greater efficiency, which have facilitated plunder, especially in the agricultural sector. Multinational corporations have successively colonized ‘a multitude of new spaces that could not previously be colonized either because the technology or the legal rights were not available’ (Paul and Steinbrecher 2003: 228–9). Since the classical enclosures of the eighteenth century, land access has been obtained by formally withdrawing traditional land rights and/or bypassing them through violence. Such enclosures have been extended by biofuel developments in the global South (Levidow and Paul 2010). As in earlier historical periods, technoscientific innovation is again promoted as means to alleviate competition for resources and to expand their availability, especially to avoid the conflicts around biofuels. Such conflicts are attributed to inefficiency or mis-management, thus diverting responsibility from market competition and its policy drivers (Franco et al. 2010). By historical analogy, ‘new efficiencies are likely to generate further economic incentives for monocultural systems to supply biomass to centralised biorefineries’ (Smith 2010: 120; cf. Levidow and Paul 2011). As indicated by the ‘biomass’ concept, natural resources are always constructed in particular ways. These reorient biophysical characteristics by devising new knowledge and technologies in order to increase productivity and thereby the accumulation of capital. For a long time, this has meant transforming nature into resources through commodification after extraction; this can be seen as the ‘formal subsumption of nature’, by analogy to labour exploitation (Boyd, Prudham and Schurman 2001). Resource use also increasingly involves the ‘intensification of biological productivity (i.e., yield, turnover time, metabolism, photosynthetic efficiency)’ — or the ‘real subsumption of nature’. Nature ‘is (re)made to work harder, faster and better’. Yet intensification efforts cannot assume the predictable compliance of nature, whose biophysical characteristics may prove recalcitrant to more efficient use. So there is no way to ensure predictability or control of nature prior to implementing new technologies (Boyd, Prudham and Schurman 2001: 563–4). Real subsumption of nature exemplifies a wider process of neoliberalizing nature. As politics by other means, this process takes many forms – privatization, marketization, deregulation, reregulation, etc. ‘For it involves the privatization and marketization of ever more aspects of biophysical reality, with the state and civil society groups facilitating this and/or regulating only its worst consequences’ (Castree 2008: 142–3). Various ecological fixes are devised for the problem of capital accumulation – often in the eco-friendly name of conserving resources, but also in the name of remaking nature. These logics show that `neoliberalism’ is, in environmental terms, an apparent paradox: in giving full reign to capital accumulation it seeks to both protect and degrade the biophysical world, while manufacturing new natures in cases where that world is physically fungible. In short, nature’s neoliberalisation is about conservation and its two antitheses of destroying existing and creating new biophysical resources. (Castree 2008: 150) A similar contradiction arises in techno-fixes for environmental problems: such innovations reconceptualize and redesign natural resources for more effective commoditization, while also accounting for such resources in its own market-like image.

#### Neoliberalism causes extinction

Darder, 10 – Professor Antonia Darder, Distinguished Professor of Education, University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign (“Preface” in *Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, & Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement* by Richard V. Kahn, 2010, pp. x-xiii)//VP

GENDER MODIFIED

It is fitting to begin my words about Richard Kahn’s Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement with a poem. The direct and succinct message of The Great Mother Wails cuts through our theorizing and opens us up to the very heart of the book’s message—to ignite a fire that speaks to **the ecological crisis** at hand; a crisis orchestrated by the inhumane greed and economic brutality of the wealthy. Nevertheless, as is clearly apparent, none of us is absolved from complicity with the devastating destruction of the earth. As members of the global community, we are all implicated in this destruction by the very manner in which we define ourselves, each other, and all living beings with whom we reside on the earth. Everywhere we look there are glaring signs of political systems and social structures that propel us toward **unsustainability and extinction**. In this historical moment, the planet faces some of the most horrendous forms of “[hu]man-made” devastation ever known to humankind. Cataclysmic “natural disasters” in the last decade have sung the environmental hymns of planetary imbalance and reckless environmental disregard. A striking feature of this ecological crisis, both locally and globally, is the **overwhelming concentration of wealth** held by the ruling elite and their agents of capital. This environmental malaise is characterized by the staggering loss of livelihood among working people everywhere; gross inequalities in educational opportunities; an absence of health care for millions; an unprecedented number of people living behind bars; and trillions spent on fabricated wars fundamentally tied to the control and domination of the planet’s resources. The Western ethos of mastery and supremacy over nature has accompanied, to our detriment, the unrelenting expansion of capitalism and its unparalleled domination over all aspects of human life. This hegemonic worldview has been unmercifully imparted through a host of public policies and practices that conveniently gloss over gross inequalities as commonsensical necessities for democracy to bloom. As a consequence, the liberal democratic rhetoric of “we are all created equal” hardly begins to touch the international pervasiveness of racism, patriarchy, technocracy, and economic piracy by the West, all which have fostered the erosion of civil rights and the unprecedented ecological exploitation of societies, creating conditions that now threaten our peril, if we do not reverse directions. Cataclysmic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, are unfortunate testimonies to the danger of ignoring the warnings of the natural world, especially when coupled with egregious governmental neglect of impoverished people. Equally disturbing, is the manner in which ecological crisis is vulgarly exploited by unscrupulous and ruthless capitalists who see no problem with turning a profit off the backs of ailing and mourning oppressed populations of every species—whether they be victims of weather disasters, catastrophic illnesses, industrial pollution, or inhumane practices of incarceration. Ultimately, these constitute ecological calamities that speak to the inhumanity and tyranny of material profiteering, at the expense of precious life. The arrogance and exploitation of neoliberal values of consumption dishonor the contemporary suffering of poor and marginalized populations around the globe. Neoliberalism denies or simply mocks (“Drill baby drill!”) the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists between all living beings, including the body earth. In its stead, values of individualism, competition, privatization, and the “free market” systematically debase the ancient ecological knowledge of indigenous populations, who have, implicitly or explicitly, rejected the fabricated ethos of “progress and democracy” propagated by the West. In its consuming frenzy to gobble up the natural resources of the planet for its own hyperbolic quest for material domination, the exploitative nature of capitalism and its burgeoning technocracy has dangerously deepened the structures of social exclusion, through the destruction of the very biodiversity that has been key to our global survival for millennia. Kahn insists that this devastation of all species and the planet must be fully recognized and soberly critiqued. But he does not stop there. Alongside, he rightly argues for political principles of engagement for the construction of a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that is founded on economic redistribution, cultural and linguistic democracy, indigenous sovereignty, universal human rights, and a fundamental respect for all life. As such, Kahn seeks to bring us all back to a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is unquestionably rooted in an integral order of knowledge, imbued with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom. Within the context of such an ecologically grounded epistemology, Kahn uncompromisingly argues that our organic relationship with the earth is also intimately tied to our struggles for cultural self-determination, environmental sustainability, social and material justice, and global peace. Through a carefully framed analysis of past disasters and current ecological crisis, Kahn issues an urgent call for a critical ecopedagogy that makes central explicit articulations of the ways in which societies construct ideological, political, and cultural systems, based on social structures and practices that can serve to promote ecological sustainability and biodiversity or, conversely, lead us down a disastrous path of unsustainability and extinction. In making his case, Kahn provides a grounded examination of the manner in which consuming capitalism manifests its repressive force throughout the globe, disrupting the very ecological order of knowledge essential to the planet’s sustainability. He offers an understanding of critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that inherently critiques the history of Western civilization and the anthropomorphic assumptions that sustain patriarchy and the subjugation of all subordinated living beings—assumptions that continue to inform traditional education discourses around the world. Kahn incisively demonstrates how a theory of multiple technoliteracies can be used to effectively critique the ecological corruption and destruction behind mainstream uses of technology and the media in the interest of the neoliberal marketplace. As such, his work points to the manner in which the sustainability rhetoric of mainstream environmentalism actually **camouflages** wretched neoliberal policies and practices that left unchecked **hasten the annihilation of the globe’s ecosystem**. True to its promise, the book cautions that any anti-hegemonic resistance movement that claims social justice, universal human rights, or global peace must contend forthrightly with the deteriorating ecological crisis at hand, as well as consider possible strategies and relationships that rupture the status quo and transform environmental conditions that threaten disaster. A failure to integrate ecological sustainability at the core of our political and pedagogical struggles for liberation, Kahn argues, is to blindly and misguidedly adhere to an anthropocentric worldview in which emancipatory dreams are deemed solely about human interests, without attention either to the health of the planet or to the well-being of all species with whom we walk the earth.

#### The alternative is to reject the 1ac to interrogate neoliberal economic engagement with latin America from the starting point of knowledge production- that is a prerequisite to breaking down neoliberalism

**Walsh, 12** – Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)//VP

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with Latin American reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

## 1

#### No extinction

**Carter et. Al 11–** Robert, PhD, Adjuct Research Fellow, James Cook University, Craig Idso, PhD, Chairman at the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Fred Singer, PhD, President of the Science and Environmental Policy Project, Susan Crockford, evolutionary biologist with a specialty in skeletal taxonomy , paleozoology and vertebrate evolution, Joseph D’Aleo, 30 years of experience in professional meteorology, former college professor of Meteorology at Lyndon State College, Indur Goklany, independent scholar, author, and co-editor of the Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Sherwood Idso, President of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change, Research Physicist with the US Department of Agriculture, Adjunct Professor in the Departments of Geology, Botany, and Microbiology at Arizona State University, Bachelor of Physics, Master of Science, and Doctor of Philosophy, all from the University of Minnesota, Madhav Khandekar, former research scientist from Environment Canada and is an expert reviewer for the IPCC 2007 Climate Change Panel, Anthony Lupo, Department Chair and Professor of Atmospheric Science at the University of Missouri, Willie Soon, astrophysicist at the Solar and Stellar Physics Division of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, Mitch Taylor (Canada) (March 8th, “[Surviving](file:///C%3A%5CUsers%5CVivienne%5CMarc%5CDesktop%5CSurviving) the Unpreceented Climate Change of the IPCC” <http://www.nipccreport.org/articles/2011/mar/8mar2011a5.html>) Jacome

On the other hand, they indicate that some biologists and climatologists have pointed out that "many of the predicted increases in climate have happened before, in terms of both magnitude and rate of change (e.g. Royer, 2008; Zachos *et al*., 2008), and yet biotic communities have remained remarkably resilient (Mayle and Power, 2008) and in some cases thrived (Svenning and Condit, 2008)." But they report that those who mention these things are often "placed in the 'climate-change denier' category," although the purpose for pointing out these facts is simply to present "a sound scientific basis for understanding biotic responses to the magnitudes and rates of climate change predicted for the future through using the vast data resource that we can exploit in fossil records." Going on to do just that, Willis *et al*. focus on "intervals in time in the fossil record when atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased up to 1200 ppm, temperatures in mid- to high-latitudes increased by greater than 4°C within 60 years, and sea levels rose by up to 3 m higher than present," describing studies of past biotic responses that indicate "the scale and impact of the magnitude and rate of such climate changes on biodiversity." And what emerges from those studies, as they describe it, "is evidence for rapid community turnover, migrations, development of novel ecosystems and thresholds from one stable ecosystem state to another." And, most importantly in this regard, they report "there is very little evidence for broad-scale extinctions due to a warming world." In concluding, the Norwegian, Swedish and UK researchers say that "based on such evidence we urge some caution in assuming broad-scale extinctions of species will occur due solely to climate changes of the magnitude and rate predicted for the next century," reiterating that "the fossil record indicates remarkable biotic resilience to wide amplitude fluctuations in climate.

**No impact to failed states - reject their flawed studies**

**Logan and Preble 10** (Justin, Associate Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato, and Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies @ Cato, " Washington’s Newest Bogeyman: Debunking the Fear of Failed States," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer)//NR

A survey of the formal studies of state failure reveals a methodological wasteland. Analysts have created a number of listings of failed states, which have, in fairness, overlapped considerably; all are populated by poor countries, many of which have been wracked by interstate or civil violence.48 However, instead of adhering to basic social-scientific standards of inquiry, in which questions or puzzles are observed and then theories are described and tested using clearly defined independent and dependent variables, analysts began by drawing up a category—failed state—and then attempted to create data sets from which theoretical inferences could be induced. To take one prominent case, the authors of the State Failure Task Force Report contracted by the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Intelligence chose to adjust their definition of “failed state” after their initial criteria did not produce an adequate data set for the quantitative tests the researchers wanted to perform. After dramatically expanding the definition, the task force produced almost six times more countries that could be coded “failed” as compared with their original criteria and then proceeded with their statistical analysis. They justified this highly questionable decision on the judgment that “events that fall beneath [the] total-collapse threshold often pose challenges to US foreign policy as well.”49 Subsequently, the task force changed its name to the “Political Instability Task Force” and appeared to back away from the term failed state.50 Beyond methodological shortcomings, the lists of failed states reveal only that there are many countries plagued by severe problems. The top 10 states in the 2009 Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy magazine Failed States Index include two countries the United States occupies (Iraq and Afghanistan), one country without any central government to speak of (Somalia), four poor African states (Zimbabwe, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic), two resource-rich but unstable African countries (Sudan and Guinea) and a nuclear-armed Muslim country, population 176 million (Pakistan). The sheer diversity of the countries on the lists makes clear that few policy conclusions could be drawn about a country based on its designation as a failed state. In fact, what has happened is that analysts have seized on an important single data point—Afghanistan in the 1990s and 2000s—and used it to justify a focus on failed states more broadly. Because Afghanistan met anyone’s definition of failed state and because it clearly contained a threat, analysts concluded en masse that failed states were threatening. When confronted with the reality that the countries regularly included on lists of failed states include such strategic non-entities as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, and East Timor, advocates of focusing on state failure routinely point back at the single case that can be justified directly on US national security grounds: Afghanistan.51 Even in Afghanistan, however, remedying the condition of “state failure” would not have eliminated the threat, and eliminating the threat—by killing or capturing Osama bin Laden and his confederates—would not have remedied the “failure.” The fact that expansive claims about the significance of state failure have been used to market studies of the subject, when viewed in light of the diverse and mostly nonthreatening states deemed “failed,” leaves the impression of a bait and switch. For instance, the 2007 update of the Failed States Index promises on the magazine’s cover to explain “why the world’s weakest countries pose the greatest danger.” The opening lines of the article declare that failed states “aren’t just a danger to themselves. They can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away.” Strikingly, then, the article does little to back up or even argue these claims. It instead shrugs that “failing states are a diverse lot” and that “there are few easy answers to their troubles.” By 2009, the index was conceding that “greater risk of failure is not always synonymous with greater consequences of failure,” and that the state failure-terrorism link “is less clear than many have come to assume.”52 Given these concessions undermining the idea that state failure is threatening, one wonders why scholars continue to study failed states at all. As seen above, the countries on lists of failed states are so diverse that it is difficult to draw any conclusions about a state’s designation as failed. But the purpose, one would think, of creating a new category of states would be to unify countries that share attributes that can inform either how we think about these states or how we craft policies toward these states. Instead, the scholarship on state failure has arbitrarily grouped together countries that have so little in common that neither academic research nor policy work should be influenced by this concept. Despite repeated claims to the contrary, learning that a task force has deemed a particular state “failed” is not particularly useful. Start with the Conclusions and Work Backward Existing scholarship on state failure seems to indicate that the conclusion led to the analysis, rather than vice versa. Scholars who argue that “failed state” is a meaningful category and/or indicative of threat provide a rationale for American interventionism around the globe. Given the arbitrary creation of the category “failed state” and the extravagant claims about its significance, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that research on failed states constitutes, as one analyst put it, “an eminently political discourse, counseling intervention, trusteeship, and the abandonment of the state form for wide swaths of the globe.”53

#### No Russia-China war

**Record, 01** (Jeffrey, professor of strategy and international security at the Air War College, Aerospace Power Journal, Winter, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj01/win01/record.html)//VP

What if China began absorbing the RFE? This prospect is certainly plausible. Moscow's control over the RFE has steadily weakened since the Soviet Union's demise; the RFE's economy is fast becoming a subsidiary of China's; and Chinese demographic infiltration of the RFE could eventually raise the issue of the RFE's self-determination in China's favor. Yet, on what basis would the United States intervene against even an overt Chinese invasion of the RFE, and could it intervene effectively? To be sure, China's assumption of control over the RFE's littoral and Siberia's vast, if hard to extract, resources would call for a fundamental reassessment of Chinese intentions and capabilities in Asia—perhaps leading to the creation of new security alliances in South and Southeast Asia and major increases in defense expenditure. But it is difficult to imagine an American war on behalf of Russian attempts to hold on to nineteenth-century czarist territorial gains in the Far East. But for its long-range nuclear missiles, one could consider Russia finished as a great power; in any event, it is highly doubtful that US airpower alone could overturn a Chinese invasion of the RFE. During the Cold War, the United States and its Pacific allies lived with a hostile East Asian mainland littoral stretching from the Bering Sea to the South China Sea. Why should the United States fear Chinese nuclear missiles in the RFE more than it did Soviet missiles there?

## 2

**No scenario for Asian wars – countries defend and deter on their own**

**Gholz, Press, and Sapolsky, 97** (Eugene Gholz and Daryl Press, doctoral candidates in political science at MIT. Harvey Sapolsky, professor of public policy at MIT. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4. Spring 1997, KONTOPOULOS)

As in Europe, the United States currently has about 100,000 military personnel stationed in Asia, all of whom should be brought home and demobilized. The United States should end its commitments to Japan and South Korea, cease military cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), withdraw from the Australia, New Zealand, United States Pact (ANZUS), and terminate the implicit guarantee to Taiwan, giving those nations new incentives to take care of themselves. No Asian ally of the United States faces an overwhelming conventional threat. It requires astounding assumptions about the relative fighting strength of North and South Korean soldiers to develop a military balance requirement for U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula. South Korea may want to improve its defenses further to replace capabilities that the United States is expected to supply – e.g., build a larger air force – but it is difficult to understand how a country with twice the population and twenty times the economic power of its primary competitor, not to mention a substantial technological lead, cannot find the resources to defend itself. Current US strategy implicitly assumes that America must remain engaged because of the Asian countries' failure to balance against Chinese strength. But Japan and Taiwan, the two plausible targets for Chinese aggression, are more than capable of defending themselves from conventional attack. Both enjoy the geographic advantage of being islands. The surrounding oceans ensure a defense dominance that could only be overcome with enormous material or technological advantages. The amphibious operations required for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or Japan would be extremely difficult and at a minimum would require substantial investment in amphibious warfare capability. Taiwan could extract a withering toll on invading forces. Its air force is large, sophisticated, and growing; its navy has deadly missile boats; and it produces anti-ship cruise missiles. The same Taiwanese forces would make a Chinese blockade of Taiwan even harder. China would find it difficult to harass Taiwanese ports on the eastern side of the island with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles.41 Chinese attacks on shipping would be blocked by Taiwan's air superiority and sea control, and Chinese blockading forces would find it difficult to cover the wide swath of ocean around Taiwan, China could use its ballistic missile force to conduct terror attacks against Taiwanese targets, but terror attacks have negligible military or long-run political effects-witness the failures of the German Blitz and of the sustained IRA bombing campaign against the United Kingdom. As long as Taiwan has access to advanced Western weapons, it will be able to defend itself, Japan's threat environment is even more benign. Its "moat" is wider than the Taiwan Strait. Japan's large, sophisticated air and naval forces give it great defensive capabilities, and air and naval warfare play directly to Japan’s technological advantage. The side with the best sensors can target the enemy first, gaining an enormous advantage; empirical evidence suggests that the better trained or technologically superior air force can achieve favorable exchange ratios of 10:1 or greater. Japan's east-coast ports would make a blockade with ground-launched anti-ship cruise missiles technically impossible and would increase the area of coverage for blockading forces beyond the reasonable limits of any non-American navy's sustainment capability. Finally, anti-submarine warfare capability is a particular strength of the Japanese armed forces because of the Cold War mission for which they were designed. This sanguine analysis of the Asian military balances has not yet considered a last defensive advantage: the ability of defenders to seek balancing alliances. In a 1994 article, Gerald Segal argues that continued American military engagement in Asia is necessary because Asian nations have failed to balance Chinese power. Segal's conclusions, however, are inconsistent with the details he recounts of balancing by Asian countries whenever American military protection is absent. He reports that Vietnam has made enough progress at internal balancing to restrict the Chinese military actions in the South China Sea, and that Australia and Indonesia have made new commitments, jointly and separately, to oppose Chinese expansionism. If China sought to acquire significant power projection assets, U.S. allies could no longer afford to voice their minor disputes with each other; they would work together to contain Chinese threats.

#### Asia is resilient

**Bloomberg** 6/13/**12** (Andrew Sharp, economic writer for Bloomberg in Tokyo, “Asia Shows Resilience As Europe Debt Concerns Mount” [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-13/japan-machine-orders-rose-more-than-forecast-on-reconstruction.html)//](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-13/japan-machine-orders-rose-more-than-forecast-on-reconstruction.html%29//) CG

Japan’s machinery orders increased more than economists expected and South Korea’s unemployment fell as Asian economies show resilience in the face of Europe’s sovereign-debt crisis. Bookings, an indicator of capital spending, rose 5.7 percent in April from March, the Cabinet Office said in Tokyo. That compared with analysts’ median estimate of a 1.6 percent gain. South Korea’s jobless rate declined to 3.2 percent in May from 3.4 percent in April. Sri Lanka kept interest rates on hold today as central bank Governor Ajith Nivard Cabraal told Bloomberg Television that his nation’s economy can grow more than 7 percent this year. Spain’s borrowing costs climbing to a record yesterday, underscoring the threat of sovereign bailouts that would stretch European Union finances to their limit. “Asian economies are proving pretty resilient,” Matthew Circosta, an economist at Moody’s Analytics in Sydney said. “We are certainly seeing some stabilization in growth across Asia,” he said, adding that fiscal and monetary stimulus in China will support the region. The MSCI Asia Pacific Index was little unchanged as of 12:14 p.m. in Tokyo before a bond sale in Italy that may show whether investors’ concerns about Spain are spreading to the larger economy. Reconstruction Demand “In the immediate term, tensions emanating from the euro area are the most serious potential risk for developing countries,” the World Bank said in a twice-yearly report yesterday. Sri Lanka’s Cabraal said today that growth momentum was sustained in the first quarter and the economy can expand 7.2 percent this year “unless something dramatic happens in the third or fourth quarters, which may not be that likely.” The decision to keep interest rates unchanged showed that officials want to shield growth from weakness in exports even as a slump in the rupee fans inflation. The central bank left the reverse repurchase rate at 9.75 percent and the repurchase rate at 7.75 percent. The Bank of Thailand will also keep borrowing costs unchanged today, according to a survey of economists by Bloomberg News. In Australia, central bank Governor Glenn Stevens today described the benefits of a strong Australian dollar, saying that it benefits consumers and probably will be sustained as mining investment intensifies. “It’s a test of adaptability,” Stevens told business, union and community leaders today in the northern city of Brisbane. “While I’m very conscious that a number of sectors are really struggling with the exchange rate where it is, we shouldn’t wish too quickly for a low exchange rate.” Japanese Manufacturing In Japan, a 20 trillion yen ($252 billion) package for rebuilding areas devastated by last year’s earthquake provides manufacturers a cushion against slowing overseas demand, while service industry hiring is aiding the labor market in South Korea. “Asian economies are resilient, but the pace of the recovery overall is slowing,” said Kiichi Murashima, chief economist at Citigroup Global Markets Japan Inc. in Tokyo. “Some exports numbers are looking dull, meaning there is some impact from advanced countries’ economies, especially Europe.” In a sign of constraints on the U.S. recovery, the Commerce Department is forecast to report that retail sales fell in May for the first time in a year, economists surveyed by Bloomberg News predict. France, Germany and Spain may report consumer prices fell in May, according to Bloomberg News surveys before announcements today. Industrial production in the euro region probably contracted in April, according to a separate survey. Rising Orders Machinery orders in Japan were 789 billion yen ($9.9 billion) in April, the highest level since October 2008, after a 2.8 percent fall the previous month. The timing of major orders can cause the results to be volatile. A waning impact from post-quake reconstruction is projected to curb the Japan’s growth rate after gross domestic product jumped at an annualized 4.7 percent pace in January-to-March. The expansion is forecast at 2 percent this quarter, according to the median estimate of analysts surveyed by Bloomberg News. The slowdown is at risk of worsening should Europe’s trauma deepen after Greek elections on June 17 that may determine whether that country remains in the euro region. Finance Minister Jun Azumi told Group of Seven counterparts June 5 that the yen’s appreciation is causing “serious damage” to the economy. South Korea added 472,000 new jobs in May as retailers, social welfare, health care, and education services hired more workers, Statistics Korea said today in Gwacheon, south of Seoul. President Lee Myung Bak said on June 11 that the country isn’t planning a supplementary fiscal program and while the year will be “very difficult,” the economy will probably grow more than 3 percent.

**Terrorists won’t pursue or use nuclear weapons**

**Waltz, 03** (Kenneth, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2003, p. 130)

For terrorists who abandon tactics of disruption and harassment in favor of dealing in wholesale death and destruction, instruments other than nuclear weapons are more readily available. Poisons and germs are easier to get than nuclear weapons, and poisoning a city’s water supply, though rather complicated, is more easily done than blowing a city up. Nevertheless, terrorists may seek to gain control of nuclear materials and use them to threaten or destroy. Yet, with shaky control of nuclear weapons materials in Russia and perhaps in Pakistan, and with the revelation in 1994 that the United States had lost track of some of its nuclear materials, one can hardly believe that nuclear weapons spreading to another country or two every now and then adds much to the chances that terrorists will be able to buy or steal nuclear materials. Plentiful sources are already available. Nuclear terror is a problem distinct from the spread of nuclear weapons to a few more countries. Terrorists have done a fair bit of damage by using conventional weapons and have sometimes got their way by threatening to use them. Might terrorists not figure they can achieve more still by threatening to explode nuclear weapons on cities of countries they may wish to bend to their bidding? Fear of nuclear terror arises from the assumption that if terrorists *can* get nuclear weapons they *will* get them, and then all hell will break loose. This is comparable to assuming that if weak states get nuclear weapons, they will use them for aggression. Both assumptions are false. Would the courses of action we fear, if followed, promise more gains than losses or more pains than profits? The answers are obvious. Terrorists have some hope of reaching their long-term goals through patient pressure and constant harassment. They cannot hope to do so by issuing unsustainable threats to wreak great destruction, threats they would not want to execute anyway.

**Diplomatic resources are finite – literally anything since 2008 would tradeoff**

Anderson & Grewell, 2k2 [Terry is a professor of economics at Montana State and J. Bishop is a Research Associate and Political Economy research Center, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps20.pdf]

Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag of goods that includes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs it down, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increased environmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violence such as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to deal with traditional international issues. As Schaefer (2000, 46) writes, “Because diplomatic currency is finite . . . it is critically important that the United States focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramount importance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographic regions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies.”

**Sequestration takes away capital**

**Landler and Mazzeti 13** (MARK LANDLER is a White House correspondent and diplomatic correspondent and MARK MAZZETTI is a is a correspondent for The New York Times shared a Pulitzer Prize for reporting on the intensifying violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan and Washington's response, May 27, 2013, “In Obama's ambitions, hurdles and inconsistencies; ¶ Risks are posed by giving diplomacy priority over military and intelligence,”http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21\_T17684379954&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29\_T17684379931&cisb=22\_T17684379957&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=8357&docNo=1//RM)

At the same time, Mr. Obama put renewed emphasis on diplomacy and foreign aid, saying these were important ways to address ''the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism.''¶ As if to underline his point, John Kerry has proved to be a surprisingly activist secretary of state, plunging into shuttle diplomacy between the Israelis and the Palestinians and becoming the administration's point man for dealing with the strife in Syria.¶ It is also true, though, that the administration is pushing a diplomatic solution in Syria because there is so little public support for military engagement and because all other available options carry risks.¶ ''The real question over time may be whether we can mobilize others to join with us to deal with these threats,'' said Dennis B. Ross, a former senior adviser to Mr. Obama on the Middle East. ''Look at Syria: would others be prepared to do more that could be effective if they saw that we were prepared to do more?''¶ Another problem with this new focus is that the administration cut the budget of the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development by 6 percent, to $47.78 billion, from $51 billion in the current year, reflecting the broader budget squeeze.¶ The impact of those cuts is even greater since there are increases of $1.5 billion for additional security personnel and upgrades to embassies and other diplomatic buildings.¶ Still, to the extent Mr. Obama's vision is realized, it would radically reorder the power centers in Washington: emboldening the State Department, gradually refocusing the C.I.A. on traditional intelligence gathering, and handing primary responsibility for lethal operations to the Pentagon.¶ The military's elite commandos would carry out raids or drone strikes only in exceptional cases; more likely, scores of Special Forces troops would train and advise indigenous forces to combat militants on their soil so that large American armies would not have to.¶ ''What we're trying to do with our strategy is turn it back over to the host country and local forces,'' Michael Sheehan, the Pentagon's top counterterrorism official, said at a Senate hearing last month. ''That is the future.''¶ For all that, some defense experts and Congressional critics said the president glossed over some of the thorniest problems.¶ Anthony H. Cordesman, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Mr. Obama still had not publicly addressed the problems the United States faces as it tries to unwind its role in the Afghan war.¶ ''We needed clear goals for a meaningful strategic agreement with Afghanistan and to start getting the details nailed down,'' he wrote, ''not wait to point of failure as we did in Iraq.''

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**Food shocks won’t escalate**

**Salehyan, 07** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Northern Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 2007, May 29th 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>, KONTOPOULOS)

Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they are misleading. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters. Second, arguing that climate change is a root cause of conflict lets tyrannical governments off the hook. If the environment drives conflict, then governments bear little responsibility for bad outcomes. That’s why Ban Ki-moon’s case about Darfur was music to Khartoum’s ears. The Sudanese government would love to blame the West for creating the climate change problem in the first place. True, desertification is a serious concern, but it’s preposterous to suggest that poor rainfall—rather than deliberate actions taken by the Sudanese government and the various combatant factions—ultimately caused the genocidal violence in Sudan. Yet by Moon’s perverse logic, consumers in Chicago and Paris are at least as culpable for Darfur as the regime in Khartoum.

**U.S.-Mexico relations are on the upswing – transition in focus and Obama’s recent visit**

**Nelson and Nicholas, 5/2** – senior writers at The Wall Street Journal (Collin McCain, Peter, “Mexico, U.S. Leaders Try To Deepen Economic Ties”, 5/2/13, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324766604578459190363300754.html) RT

MEXICO CITY—President Barack Obama offered his support Thursdayfor Mexico's shifting security strategy as he called for a greater focus on economic ties in a relationship between the two countries that oftenhas been dominated by issues of drugs and illegal immigration. Mr. Obama arrived for a two-day visit amid signs that Mexico is moving to reduce the violent tempo of its yearslong war against drug traffickers. At the same time, President Enrique Peña Nieto is revamping his law enforcement bureaucracy, a move that will affect coordination with U.S. agencies. Previously, U.S. law-enforcement officials enjoyed widespread freedom of contact with individual Mexican agencies. The reorganization will centralize those contacts within a beefed up Interior Ministry. Mr. Obama, appearing with Mr. Peña Nieto at a joint news conference, said only Mexicans could decide their country's security policies. But headded: "I agreed to continue our close cooperation on security, even as the nature of that cooperation will evolve." Mr. Peña Nieto said Mexico remained committed to "fighting organized crime in all its modalities."But he has signaled a shift from the country's militarized campaign against drug cartels, which critics say has stoked violence, leading in the last six years to more than 60,000 deaths and 20,000 disappearances, most of them victims of fighting between feuding crime organizations. Mexican officials deny that these changes will lessen Mexico's coordination and cooperation with U.S. law enforcement efforts. "Cooperation continues to be the same, it's just that it's in a more orderly manner, using the channels that should be used everywhere" said one senior Mexican official. While the issue of security looms large during Mr. Obama's trip to Mexico, his administrationhas tried to focus this visit on broadening economic relations and spurring growth on both sides of the border. "Mexico and the United S**tates** have one of the largest, most dynamic relationships of any two countries on Earth," Mr. Obama said in the Treasury Room of the National Palace, adding: "Too often, two issues get attention: security or immigration." After a private meeting with Mr. Peña Nieto, Mr. Obama said at the news conference that the two countries plan to deepen mutual ties to make both more competitive in global trade. He said that Vice President Joe Biden would be part of a new "high-level dialogue" between U.S. and Mexican officials. However, the two also exchanged views on immigration issues, which are sensitive on both sides of the border. Mr.Obama traveled to Mexico as U.S. lawmakers continue work on rewriting immigration laws—an effort that would affect the more than 11 million Mexicans who live in the U.S. Mr. Obama predicted Congress would pass an immigration overhaul, despite pessimism about its prospects from U.S. Sen. Marco Rubio (R., Fla.), one of the bill's architects. "I expressed to President Peña Nieto that I'm optimistic about us getting this done because it's the right thing to do," Mr. Obama told reporters. While the debate in the U.S. has focused on questions about border security and a path to citizenship, Messrs. Obama and PeñaNieto were careful in addressing these topics in Mexico City, considering how their comments would be received by people in both countries. Ted Piccone, senior fellow and deputy director for foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, said Mexicans now accept border security as the political price that must be paid to ensure that other changes are made to immigration laws. Administration officials have said they are confident Mexican officials will respect the fact that these are issues for U.S. leaders to resolve. "We've emphasized on our side that this is a domestic political issue primarily," said Ricardo Zuniga, special assistant to the U.S. president and senior director for Western hemisphere affairs. Mr. PeñaNieto echoed that sentiment, praising the leadership of Mr. Obama and Congress on the issue and wishing them well. Mexico understands that this is a domestic affair for the U.S., he said. While immigration and security remain prominent in this week's talks, the administration's goal for this trip, is to look beyond those issues. "There's been a view around for a while now that the bilateral relationship, at least,with Mexico has been kind of dominated by drugs and violence," said Joshua Meltzer, a global economy and development fellow at the Brookings Institution.

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**Their risk calculus is born out of neoliberal logic---uncertainty is a trick used to either promote or reject policy based on ideological predispositions**

**Pellizzoni 11**, Associate Professor of Environmental Sociology at the University of Trieste, Italy, April 2011, “Governing through disorder: Neoliberal environmental governance and social theory,” Global Environmental Change, Vol. 21, p. 795-803//VP

This article started out with two aims: ﬁrst, to identify at the deepest, ontological, level the underpinnings of widespread environmental policy approaches often associated with neoliberalism. Second, to show that different socio-environmental theoretical perspectives have had difﬁculty confronting these underpinnings, which affects their capacity to interpret the latter’s implications for the governance of the biophysical world. Neoliberalism draws on established traditions in political liberalism and market capitalism, yet is characterized by a novel understanding of the ontological quality of nature. ‘Nature’ is no longer conceived as an objectively given, though cognitively mediated, reality, but as a constitutively ﬂuid entity, a contingency purposefully produced and controlled for instrumental ends. Governance through uncertainty, instability or ‘disorder’ thus seems to be the distinguishing feature of the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’. This ideational core may be considered the ﬁrst reason for the sense of unity often felt when contemplating the array of sectors, approaches and cases characterizing current market-oriented environmental governance, and at the same time for the sense of uneasiness towards neoliberalism that environmental social theory conveys. Whatever the judgment, it is important to grasp what is at stake with neoliberal governance of nature. Browsing social science books and journals, one realizes that much critical energy has been focused on questioning the objectivist account of nature that allegedly dominates current policy narratives and practices. Only a discerning scholarship has begun to realize that objectivism and antiobjectivism are losing relevance as categories capable of distinguishing intellectual and stakeholder positions, and that they increasingly become claims usable in power games over the biophysical world. Attention, for example, has been recently paid to the instrumental use of uncertainty (Freudenburg et al., 2008; Jacques et al., 2008), which, depending on the circumstances, is used either to ask for policy-making (as with GMOs) or to call for policy-avoiding (as with ‘unwarranted’ restrictive measures related to climate change). The very possibility of appealing to ‘sound science’ either for evidence of no problems, or no evidence of problems indicates the fundamentally anti-objectivist attitude that characterizes present political and cultural frameworks. Policy promoters share this attitude with their opponents. Those who ask for ‘precaution’ use the same arguments in reverse, requiring action when and where there is no evidence of no problems. 11 This commonality entails that appeals to uncertainty are devoid of any strategic relevance in current controversies; rather, they play a tactical role. This is likely to represent a problem above all for counter-forces to neoliberalism, to the extent that in a tactical struggle the most advantaged are those provided with greater organizational, economic, cognitive and legal resources (to say nothing of military ones). In short, we are today in front of a refashioning of the symbolic order of society vis-a` -vis its biophysical underpinnings. In this change, neoliberal discourses, policies and practices are at the same time a powerful driver and a result. Disorder becomes order to the extent that uncertainty, contingency and instability are regarded not as disabling by-products of governance but as enabling ways of governing. In the public realm, this ends up constituting a sort of shared horizon of meaning: not only is no new ‘order’ (in the traditional sense) in sight, but anti-essentialism overﬂows from intellectual avant-gardes to become a widespread, albeit often implicit or negotiable, worldview.

**Neolib is used as political cover by politicians— you are not a policy maker and fiat is illusary – the case doesn't exist as something you can evaluate outside their project of modernity – ONLY epistemology matters**

**Hay and Rosamund, PhDs, 2002** (Colin and Ben, Journal of European Public Policy Volume 9, Issue 2, 2002 p.6-8)//VP

The question of intentionality is here a key issue and a consistent theme of the paper. It is important, at the outset, that we differentiate between the internalisation of a discourse of globalisation as an accurate representation of the relevant ‘material’ constraints and the more intentional, reflexive and **strategic choice** of such a discourse as a convenient justification for policies pursued for altogether **different reasons.** In the first scenario ideas about globalisation might be held to be constitutive (in part) of the perceived interests of political actors; in the latter, they are more of an instrument device deployed in the promotion of a set of extant preferences and (perceived) interests.6 There is plenty of evidence, as we shall see, of actors deploying particular rhetorics of globalisation in the attempt to justify often unpalatable social and economic reform. Whether this should be interpreted as evidence for an unreflexive internalisation of a discourse of external economic constraint or as an exercise in responsibility-displacement is an interesting methodological conundrum to which we return presently. Returing to the example of tax competition, if we envisage a (purely hypothetical) scenario in which the hyperglobalisation thesis were accurate, the free mobility of capital would indeed serve to establish tax competition between fiscal authorities seeking to hold onto existing investment whilst enticing mobile foreign direct investors to relocate. The price of any attempt to buck the trend is immediate capital flight with consequent effects on budget revenue. In such a scenario any rational administration aware (or assuming itself to be aware) of the mobility of capital will cut corporate taxes with the effect that no exit will be observed (scenario 1 in Figure 2). Any administration foolish enough to discount or test the mobility of capital by retaining high levels of corporate taxation will be rudely awakened from its state of blissful ignorance by a rapid exodus of capital (scenario 2). In a world of perfect factor mobility, then, the learning curve is likely to prove very steep indeed. Yet this is to assume an entirely unreflexive and non-instrumental attitude towards the discourse of globalisation1. It is important that we also consider a modification of scenario 1 in which the administration in question does not regard globalisation as a significant external constraint but perceives strategic advantage from presenting it in such terms. The outcome would, of course, be the same — corporate tax cuts (pursued for whatever ends), no observed exit and a seeming confirmation of the hyperglobalisation thesis. Assume instead that we inhabit a world in which the mobility of capital is much exaggerated and in which capital has a clear vested interest in threatening exit even where that threat is scarcely credible, and the scenario unfolds rather differently. Here, fiscal authorities lulled into accepting the hyperglobalisation thesis by the (ultimately hollow) exit threats of capital, or disingenuously presenting globalisation as a convenient external economic constraint, will cut rates of corporate tax, (falsely) attributing the lack of capital flight to their competitive taxation regime (scenario 3). Yet, were they to resist this logic by calling capital’s bluff they might retain substantial taxation receipts without fear of capital flight (scenario 4). The crucial point is that if we observe reductions in net corporate taxation over time with minimal evidence of capital flight we are incapable, on the empirical evidence alone, of adjudicating between scenario 1 in which the effects of the globalisation thesis are indeed true and scenario 3 in which the globalisation thesis is a hegemonic delusion. We are also incapable of differentiating between the ingenuous and the disingenuous appeal to globalisation as an non-negotiable external economic constraint. This is but one example. What it, and others like it, suggest is that the discourse of globalisation may play a crucial independent role in the generation of the effects invariably attributed to globalisation and invariably held to indicate its logic of inevitability (Hay and Watson 1998; Hay, Watson and Wincott 1999).7 In a context in which direct corporate tax rates have fallen over time — and in which that process has been linked publicly to the constraints imposed by globalisation (Blair and Schröder 1999: 167; Schwanhold and Pfender 1998; 21-2; cf. Lafontaine 1998: 5) — this is a not insignificant point.8 This in turn suggests the importance of differentiating clearly between: (i) the effects of globalisation itself; (ii) the effects of having internalised popular constructions of globalisation; and, indeed, (iii) **the strategic and disingenuous appeal to globalisation as a convenient justification for unpalatable reforms.** All too frequently the second is mistaken for the first; the third discounted altogether. And it is easy to see why. For the effects of having internalised or deployed strategically assumptions about globalisation may, in time, become almost as entrenched as if they were produced by an inexorable globalising logic. The effects of tax competition are, after all, no less real if informed by assumptions about the mobility of capital which are demonstrably false. Moreover, once established, the momentum of a process such as tax competition may be difficult to halt. Does it matter, then, whether the effects frequently attributed to globalisation are direct products of the demonstrable ‘material reality’ of globalisation or of more or less accurate constructions of globalisation’s assumed imperatives or of an entirely duplicitous appeal to globalisation’s convenient exigencies? Whilst in one sense it may not (the immediate outcome, after all, is the same), in another the difference is extremely significant. In one account we identify an inexorable and fatalistic unfolding economic ‘logic of no alternative’ operating beyond the control or purview of political actors whom we might hold accountable for its consequences. In the other two we have an open-ended, contingent and — crucially — political dynamic to which potentially accountable agents might be linked (see also Hay 2000). Differentiating between the effects of globalisation on the one hand and the effects of dominant discourses of globalisation and the use made of such discourses on the other is, then, an integral aspect of restoring notions of political responsibility and accountability to contemporary political and economic dynamics. It is a prime motivation for much of what follows.

#### Policy making isn’t grounded in objectivity but cherry picking. Means a residual link takes out the aff because the ideological underpinnings of their knowledge is inaccurate.

**Bristow, 05** – Cardiff University economic geographer senior lecturer (Gillian, “Everyone's a ‘winner’: problematising the discourse of regional competitiveness”, Journal of Economic Geography, June, oxford journals)//VP

This begs the question as to why a discourse with ostensibly confused, narrow and ill-defined content has become so salient in regional economic development policy and practice as to constitute ‘the only valid currency of argument’ (Schoenberger, 1998, 12). Whilst alternative discourses based around co-operation can be conceived (e.g. see Hines, 2000; Bunzl, 2001), they have as yet failed to make a significant impact on the dominant view that a particular, quantifiable form of output-related regional competitiveness is inevitable, inexorable and ultimately beneficial. The answer appears to lie within the policy process, which refers to all aspects involved in the provision of policy direction for the work of the public sector. This therefore includes ‘the ideas which inform policy conception, the talk and work which goes into providing the formulation of policy directions, and all the talk, work and collaboration which goes into translating these into practice’ (Yeatman, 1998; p. 9). A major debate exists in the policy studies literature about the scope and limitations of reason, analysis and intelligence in policy-making—a debate which has been re-ignited with the recent emphasis upon evidence-based policy-making (see Davies et al., 2000). Keynes is often cited as the main proponent of the importance of ideas in policy making, since he argued that policy-making should be informed by knowledge, truth, reason and facts (Keynes, 1971, vol. xxi, 289). However, Majone (1989) has significantly challenged the assumption that policy makers engage in a purely objective, rational, technical assessment of policy alternatives. He has argued that in practice, policy makers use theory, knowledge and evidence selectively to justify policy choices which are heavily based on value judgements. It is thus persuasion (through rhetoric, argument, advocacy and their institutionalisation) that is the key to the policy process, not the logical correctness or accuracy of theory or data. In other words, it is interests rather than ideas that shape policy making in practice. Ultimately, the language of competitiveness is the language of the business community. Thus, critical to understanding the power of the discourse is firstly, understanding the appeal and significance of the discourse to business interests and, secondly, exploring their role in influencing the ideas of regional and national policy elites.

#### Neoliberal policies are the root cause of violence, oppression, warming, and instability– the price to pay is too high

**Greenberg, 12**, - Ph.D in Anthropology at University of Michigan (James B., Thomas Weaver (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of California at Berkeley), Anne Browning-Aiken (Ph.D. in Anthropology at University of Arizona), William L. Alexander (Professor of Anthropology at University of Arizona), “The Neoliberal Transformation of Mexico,” *Neoliberalism and Commodity Production in Mexico,* University Press of Colorado, pp 334-335)//SG

Neoliberalism also underlies the growing problems of crime and violence affecting Mexico more broadly. The policies that ruined smallholder agriculture also made the country receptive to growing marijuana and poppies, thereby open- ing spaces into which drug cartels moved (see the chapter by Emanuel and chapter 9 by Weaver, this volume). The money from the drug trade has had a pernicious effect on Mexican society, creating extensive problems of corruption and increas- ing levels of violence (Campbell 2009).Neoliberal policies have driven millions of Mexicans into economic exile and helped turn Mexico into a major source of drugs. Both drugs and victims of structural violence spill across the border, as does the violence that too often accompanies them, reminding us that we live in a global society and thatneoliberalism in Mexico also has direct consequences for the United States.As we have seen with the near collapse of global financial mar- kets, problems are contagious in an increasingly integrated global economy. Just as the consequences of neoliberal policies in Mexico spill over into the United States, the impacts of US applications of neoliberalism reverberate in Mexico. As the popular saying goes, “When the United States catches a cold, Mexico catches pneumonia.” Tight credit affects commodity chains, so the consequences of the neoliberal debacle in US financial markets are felt strongly in Mexico. In sum, our major area of unease regarding neoliberalism is that, as an eco- nomic framework, the lopsided version of development it delivers comes at too high a price.While neoliberalism may further global capitalism’s frantic drive for expansion and increased profit, it has not resolved intra- and inter-nation prob- lems of inequality, environmental degradation, unequal distribution of resources and gains, global warming, lack of healthcare, instability of pension funds, cor- ruption, and clientelism. Instead, it has increased violence and oppression and generally worsened working and living conditions.

#### Neoliberalism in Mexico is a tool of the state viewing human capital as a commodity to sell and trade

**Kim**, Politics & History student and the University of Alberta in Alberta, 2012

(Dongwoo, “Modernization or Betrayal: Neoliberalism in Mexico,” Constellations, Volume 4.1 2012, pg 223-25)//SG

Thus, Carlos Salinas came to power in times of crisis in 1988. Understanding that PRI’s success was built on and perpetuated by economic prosperity during the Mexican Miracle,Salinas made economic recovery his priority.6 Furthermore, Salinas had the ambition of modernizing Mexico through the implementation of neoliberal policies. Salinas was educated at Harvard University, where he obtained two master’s degrees and a doctorate in political economy. He was stunned by “progressive thinking about global economics and the lagging development of the Third World” when he first came across neoliberal economic theory and immediately drawn to it.7 Hence, Salinas believed that he would both stabilize and modernize the country through the neoliberal transformation of Mexico. The emphasis on the association between economic prosperity, modernity, and neoliberalism is apparent in Salinas’ inaugural speech. From the onset, Salinas emphasized that “nuestros problemas no vienen por eI fracaso de nuestros esfuerzos, sirio por el tamaño de la adversidad,”8 suggesting the existence of a difficulty beyond national level. Salinas then stated that “[l]a modernización de México es indispensable,” and also “inevitable,” as it is the only way of affirming “nuestra soberanía en un mundo en profunda transformación.”9 Salinas then employed the word “modernización” various times throughout his eight-thousand-word speech.Salinas thus demonstrated his belief that the adoption of neoliberalism was not only beneficial for Mexico, but also imperative for survival in a fast-changing world. Carlos Salinas’ series of neoliberal economic policies culminated with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and Canada.Salinas was at first disinterested in forming a bilateral agreement with the United States.10 After all, the PRI had staunchly closed up the Mexican economy to the world for the last sixty years and gained popularity from its nationalist and defensive economic policies (especially against the United States), most notably the nationalization of the petroleum industry in late 1930s by president Lázaro Cárdenas. However, due to the “lukewarm” response from the world leaders during his European tour, which included a stop at the World Economic Forum in February of 1989, Salinas realized that the only way of drawing investors to Mexico was to “provide [them] with both cheap labor and privileged access to the U.S. market.”11 Salinas immediately approached the American government officials with the intention of negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement,shortly thereafter the administration shifted policies for the preparation and successful negotiation of NAFTA. CarlosSalinas thus marketed NAFTA with fervor in and outside of Mexico and hastened the pace of the neoliberal reforms. Salinas wrote that he made efforts to “disseminate more information and confirm the active presence of key economic, labor, and business leaders in working groups” during the period of NAFTA negotiation.12 His administration privatized public corporations and implemented land reforms. Furthermore, Carlos Salinas marketed his neoliberal policies as means of modernizing the Mexican politics as well, thus associating neoliberalism with democracy. In November 1990, Salinas said both political and economic problems, which he described as “clouds,” were “dissipating.”13 Some even referred to Salinas’ reforms as “Salinastroika,” paralleling these to the radical introduction of socio-political transparency and freedom in the former Soviet Union.14 The Salinas administration thus provided hope that these neoliberal economic policies would continue as political reforms as well. Seemingly, Carlos Salinas’ reforms were successful; his policies did draw foreign investments, Mexico relieved itself of a significant amount of debt and its economy grew by 4.4% in 1993.15 Salinas administration earned the reputation as a “political juggernaut” for its political competency.16 The elections for federal senators and state governors held in 1991 reflected the surging popularity of the Salinas administration; the PRI candidates won 61 percent of the congressional votes, giving Salinas “the power to make laws without having to seek any support from the opposition.”17 Most importantly, Carlos Salinas’ leadership earned the respect and confidence of foreign investors. According to Dillon and Preston, President Clinton praised Salinas for giving Mexico “better leadership than ever in [Clinton’s] lifetime” and The Wall Street Journal “looked favorably on [his] reforms.”18 Salinas was thus deemed a progressive and modern leader by the “first world,” and many believed that Mexico was truly modernizing.Many ordinary Mexicans shared this feeling of buoyancyand progress brought by NAFTA—the primary form of neoliberalism that they came across. Mexicans had long identified the United States with “modernity,”19 and although historically described as an “imperialist bully,” it was a country to be admired.20 According to Dillon and Preston, the successful negotiation of NAFTA gave Mexicans the impression that they were entering an equal relationship with the “First World countries” like the United States or Canada,and thus rendered an elevated sense of patriotism.21 Martín Calderón, an entrepreneur, echoed the ebullient sentiment of many Mexicans when he said that NAFTA would render “fantastic opportunities to Mexico.”22The economic prosperity benefited many Mexicans in the upper and middle classes.Those in the middle class then started to use credit cards to purchase “first world” luxury items, which added to the sense of modernization. Hence, neoliberalism, mainly manifested in form of NAFTA to ordinary Mexicans, was in a way perceived as the very signal of Mexico’s modernization and advancement into the “first world.” Many Mexicans, who believed in PRI government’s promises about modernization, were hopeful for political changes as well.Nonetheless, not everyone shared this sense of advancement or modernization; in fact, neoliberalism symbolized the effective betrayal of the Mexican pueblo by PRI for those in the marginalized sectors of the society. Although some Mexicans, like Martín Calderón, received the neoliberal reforms of the Salinas administration positively, many others, especially those in the marginalized sectors of the Mexican society, saw these as the betrayal of the pueblo by PRI. Contrary to their name and self-constructed image of a “Revolutionary Party,” PRI had been betraying the populist promises embodied by the Mexican Revolution and the Constitution of 1917.PRI regime had become a brutal oppressor, which had led Mario Vargas Llosa to refer to Mexico as “the perfect dictatorship.”23 The brutal acts of oppression by PRI, the crackdown of the student protesters in the Tlatelolco Massacre of 1968being just one of the many examples, had been shadowed by decades of brilliant economic performance between 1940s and 1970s. The neoliberal policies of the Salinas administration had various aspects that conflicted with the core elements of the Mexican nationalism,which had been greatly influenced by the memories and symbols of the Mexican Revolution. First, as Frederick C. Turner notes, xenophobia, especially against the United States, formed a fundamental base of the Mexican nationalism.24 The war of 1847 and loss of territories are deeply ingrained in the Mexican public discourse. However, the main element of the modern Mexican nationalism is the memories of the Mexican Revolution of 1910. As Lynn Stephen claims, the images of Emiliano Zapata, the leader of the original Zapatista movement, were “[served] as a symbol for the institutionalization and nationalization of the Mexican Revolution,primarilyunderthetutelageof[...]PRI.”25 HenryC.SchmidtnotesthattheRevolution came to be perceived as the “protean mythos of nationhood.”26 The Constitution of 1917, which was born out of the Revolution, fulfilled—at least in words—the pueblo’s demand for land reform (ejidos) and empowered the labor sector through the articles 27 and 123, respectively.27 All of these historical memories were embedded in the discourse of national identity, more so as PRI had appropriated and perpetuated these to legitimize its rule. All in all, the Mexican Revolution played a fundamental role in shaping the modern national identity of Mexico. Therefore, the neoliberal policies of the Salinas administration that challenged the achievements of the Mexican Revolution and opened up to the United States, the ancient enemy and “imperialist bully,” symbolized PRI’s turning away from the promises of the Mexican Revolutionand even the Mexican pueblo itself. Alejandra, one of the interviewees of Judith Hellman, echoes the sentiment of betrayal incurred by neoliberalism when she says that the “real history of Mexico has become an embarrassment to the regime.”28 The following cases of unions, maquila workers, and land reforms, which demonstrate the contradiction of the promises of the Constitution of 1917, support my claim that the neoliberal policies undertaken by the PRI regime symbolize the clear betrayal on the Mexican pueblo.Carlos Salinas trampled the workers’ rights, one of the key victories of the Mexican Revolution enshrined in the Constitution of 1917, as part of his neoliberal economic agenda. The article 123 of the Constitution of 1917, among many other things, guarantees the right of the workers, whether employed by public or private enterprises, to organize and strike; it states that “[t]oda persona tiene derecho al trabajo digno y socialmente útil; al efecto, se promoverán la creación de empleos y la organización social de trabajo, conforme a la ley.”29 Salinas’ brutal crackdown on union workers, which completely contradicted the article 123, symbolized the continuation of the PRI government’s betrayal and oppression. For Salinas, the crackdown of the unions was a necessary step before the implementation of his neoliberal policies. In the context of free trade with Canada and the United States, the “competitive advantage” of Mexico consisted of “cheap labor” and “a minimum of state intervention in the economy,” and thus the labor had to be subdued before anything else.30 According to Mark Eric Williams, most of the scholars agree that the “weak labor opposition,” diluted in the CTM, was one of the key characteristics of the Mexican industry that allowed Salinas to implement his privatization policies.31 However, the labor leaders who wielded significant influence in Mexican society, such as Joaquín Hernández or Agapito Gónzalez definitely posed a threat to Salinas’ agenda and hence it was necessary for him to overcome this opposition beforehand.Instead of negotiation, which would have been preferred in modernized countries and more in line with the Constitution of 1917, Salinas chose a rather caudillo and PRI method of resolving conflicts: brutal crackdown.

#### That outweighs – We have an obligation to reduce Latin American poverty – complacency represents acceptance

O’Donnell, 96 – (Guillermo, Helen Kellogg Professor of Government and International Studies, Academic Director of the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame; “POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: SOME POLITICAL REFLECTIONS,” [http://-www.rrojasdatabank.info/225odonnell.pdf)//VP](http://-www.rrojasdatabank.info/225odonnell.pdf%29//VP)

Extensive poverty and deep social inequality are characteristics of Latin America that go back to the colonial period. We have not overcome these conditions; we have aggravated them. One may point out that some problems in some countries did not turn out so badly, especially among those that have registered high rates of economic growth in recent years; but even these countries’ present poverty and inequality data look bad indeed when compared with data from the 1960s and early 1970s. Or, as the dominant mood in the 1980s dictated, one may argue that the current increases in poverty and inequality are the unavoidable consequence of correcting past errors. Or one may simply ignore these trends, availing oneself of some of the many mechanisms that human beings invent for justifying their callousness toward others. One way or the other, these stances naturalize poverty and inequality: although different from arguments of centuries past, they still cast poverty and inequality as inevitable consequences of the natural ordering of things. From this point of view, while one may regret some of the visible manifestations of such ordering, it would be senseless, if not worse, to try to change it. Poverty-generated needs are so many and so vital that one is morally and professionally impelled to alleviate them. But these efforts, and the highly specialized knowledge required, should not detract from attempting to grasp the overall picture and forging alliances that are premised on broad agreements about a non-naturalized vision of what poverty and inequality are and what might done about them. Of course, remedial action should be praised: in terms of actual human beings it does make a lot of difference. Also praiseworthy is moral indignation leading to energetic condemnations of the situation and proposals for a much better world—but too often we are not told how to get from here to there, and in the meantime these invocations often include a disparaging tone toward ‘mere’ remedial actions. 2) Somewhere in the middle there are various policy prescriptions, typical of reports of various commissions and international organizations, with which in most cases I agree. These include improving tax collection and making the tax system less regressive; investing more resources in social policies and finding more creative means of cooperation between the state and NGOs, churches, and business; correctly targeting some social policies; promoting popular participation; and other good ideas that I need not detail here. Although some progress in some policy areas has been registered in some countries, an obvious question is why so little of so much good advice has been actually implemented. The third hard fact is that the poor are politically weak. Their permanent struggle for survival is not conducive, excepting very specific (and usually short-lived) situations and some remarkable individuals, to their organization and mobilization. Furthermore, this weakness opens ample opportunity for manifold tactics of cooptation, selective repression, and political isolation. Democracy makes a difference, in that the poor may use their votes to support parties that are seriously committed to improving their lot.

#### No link

**Munck, 03** - professor of Globalization and Social Exclusion (Ronaldo, Department of Sociology, Social Policy & Social Work Studies and Globalisation and Social Exclusion Unit, University of Liverpool, “Neoliberalism, necessitarianism and alternatives in Latin America: there is no alternative (TINA)?”, Third World Quarterly, Vol 24, No 3, pp 495–511, 2003, http://www-e.uni-magdeburg.de/evans/Journal%20Library/Trade%20and%20Countries/Neoliberalism,%20necessitarianism%20and%20alternatives%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf)//VP

A progressive alternative to real neoliberalism might be developed by critical intellectuals, and articulated by leftist political parties but, arguably, without a mobilised civil society all this will not come to fruition. A cowed, disorientated and demobilised civil society will be a poor vehicle for progressive transforma- tion of any kind. **This is not a simplistic, utopian, or even ultimately a manipula- tive argument for a politics 'from below'** to counter the dominant politics 'from above'. It is just that, if we look at Chile, Brazil, Central America, we see that where and when civil society has become activated, progressive or democratic alternatives are more likely to prosper. The World Bank certainly understands fully the importance of civil society in achieving social support for neoliberal globalisation and giving it a social 'face'. Certainly for a progressive alternative it will be necessary to recover alternatives from the anti-authoritarian democratic socialist traditions to counter the current infatuation with building 'social capital', a discursive terrain firmly dominated by the new global technocracy.

#### 1) They reinforce exclusion of farmers – their McDonald evidence does not say that financial benefits of the plan will go to the farmers - neoliberal policies hurt Mexican workers, labor mobility, and economy—precludes aff solvency

**Otero**, **11** – Professor of Sociology at Simon Fraser University (Gerardo, “Neoliberal Globalization, NAFTA, and Migration: Mexico's Loss of Food and Labor Sovereignty”, Journal of Poverty 15:4, 2011, University of Michigan Libraries)//AS

This article explores the way in which the U.S. economy has faced the crisis of the Fordist stage of capitalism since the 1970s by focusing on a cheap-labor strategy to restore profitability. **By endorsing** the North American Free Trade Agreement (**NAFTA), U.S. officials ensured access to an abundant supply of labor south of the border**. For their part, **Mexico's political technocrats placed their bet for economic growth on** the comparative advantage of **cheap labor. This has been a losing bet for the workers of both countries: Neoliberalism** and Mexico's integration into the North American economy—without free labor mobility—**have had a detrimental impact, particularly on Mexico**. **The counterpart of its loss of food self-sufficiency by growing dependency on U.S.-grains imports has been the loss of labor sovereignty.** Defined as the ability of a nation to generate employment with livable wages for the vast majority of the population, **labor sovereignty has been a casualty of Mexico's economic integration with its northern neighbors**. The most visible result of this loss has been substantially increased out-migration rates, **with vast numbers of displaced Mexican workers flowing into the United States in search for work**, most often unauthorized or undocumented. More specifically, this article explores the relation between food self-sufficiency and labor sovereignty in the midst of Mexico's integration to its northern neighbors, especially to the U.S. economy. It compares and contrasts food self-sufficiency in the three NAFTA countries around production for the domestic market, per-capita calorie consumption, and overall food trade. The main proposition is that food-self-sufficiency is a condition for a country to enjoy labor sovereignty, as defined above. Of the three NAFTA nations, Mexico is the least self-sufficient, and hence the one that expels the largest rate of migrants. Although Mexico's exports of fruits and vegetables to the United States and Canada increased substantially since the late 1980s, this sector did not generate nearly enough employment to absorb bankrupted peasants. Therefore, **Mexico has become dependent on the importation of basic-subsistence grains, which used to be produced by smallholder peasant farmers.** Many peasants became redundant in the Mexican economy, and their only way out, literally, has been to migrate to the United States or Canada. Although most migrants to Canada (a small minority) enter that country as part of state-sponsored guest worker programs ([Otero & Preibisch, 2010](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10875549.2011.614514#CIT0025)), the vast majority of migrants to the United States do so as undocumented or unauthorized workers. **The presence of large masses of low-skill workers in the United States, authorized or not, raises huge issues of labor rights, discrimination, and exclusion.** It has been documented that **there is an inverse relation between numbers and rights** ([Ruhs & Martin, 2008](http://www.tandfonline.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/10875549.2011.614514%22%20%5Cl%20%22CIT0032)): **the more migrant workers there are in rich countries, the fewer their rights are**, and vice versa. The fact is that employer demand for workers is “negatively sloped” with respect to labor costs, which means that more rights for migrants typically means higher costs. In North America, the United States tends to have much higher “numbers” than rights, whereas Canada tries to fit the Scandinavian model of fewer numbers and more rights. But numbers of guest workers in Canada have started to outpace the numbers of immigrants as permanent residents or citizens as of 2006, which raises the question whether both of NAFTA's rich countries are converging toward the numbers side of the equation to the detriment of workers' rights. One question about the numbers-rights tradeoff is what can human and labor rights policy makers and activists envision in addressing it? As is seen below, answers to this question will depend on the perspective one takes in migration debates. Although this article briefly addresses this concern, its main goal is to address the root causes of Mexico's out-migration: its growing food dependency and its consequent loss of labor sovereignty. Consistent with this focus, the main structural solutions to workers' rights would lie in fixing Mexico's agrarian structure. Yet, though this issue is not addressed, those concerned with human and labor rights will have to address its effects on migrants in the United States.

**biofuels policy specifically towards the global South is neoliberal**

**Pellizzioni 12**—Associate Professor of Environmental and Political Sociology at the University of Trieste, Italy [Luigi, & Marja Ylönen, Published in, Neoliberalism and Technoscience: Critical Assessments, Ashgate, 2012, Chapter 7 “Neoliberalising technoscience and environment: EU policy for competitive, sustainable biofuels” Les Levidow, Theo Papaioannou and Kean Birch, http://oro.open.ac.uk/33379/1/LLTPKB\_EU\_biofuel\_policy\_NeoliberalismTechoscience\_2012.pdf)//VP

Introduction Since the 1990s the European Union’s biofuels policy has espoused several aims: energy security, greenhouse gas (GHG) savings, technology export and rural development. On these various grounds, by 2007 the EU was moving towards statutory targets, i.e. to mandate larger markets for ‘renewable energy’ including biofuels. However, controversy erupted over harmful environmental and social effects, especially in the global South, where land-use changes were anticipating and supplying a larger EU market for biofuels. In response to the controversy, policymakers and experts focused blame on ‘conventional’ biofuels, as if these were a transient yet necessary phase towards sustainable biofuels. When enacted in 2009, statutory targets were accompanied by sustainability criteria. Together these incentives and standards were expected to generate technoscientific innovation towards novel, more competitive and sustainable biofuels by using renewable resources more efficiently. Given these policy assumptions about benign markets fulfilling societal needs via technoscientific innovation, EU biofuel policy can provide a case study for relationships between neoliberalism and technoscience. This chapter will discuss how EU biofuels policy: • stimulates new markets for knowledge as well as resources; • assumes that markets drive beneficent innovation; and thus • deepens links between markets, technoscience and environment. The theoretical concept ‘neoliberalizing the environment’ will be extended to links between technoscience and natural resources.

# 1NR

## DA

#### We control time frame and magnitude – deal failure draws in global powers and goes nuclear within months

PressTV 11/13

Global nuclear conflict between US, Russia, China likely if Iran talks fail, 11/13/13, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/11/13/334544/global-nuclear-war-likely-if-iran-talks-fail/

A global conflict between the US, Russia, and China is likely in the coming months should the world powers fail to reach a nuclear deal with Iran, an American analyst says.¶ “If the talks fail, if the agreements being pursued are not successfully carried forward and implemented, then there would be enormous international pressure to drive towards a conflict with Iran before [US President Barack] Obama leaves office and that’s a very great danger that no one can underestimate the importance of,” senior editor at the Executive Intelligence Review Jeff Steinberg told Press TV on Wednesday. ¶ “The United States could find itself on one side and Russia and China on the other and those are the kinds of conditions that can lead to miscalculation and general roar,” Steinberg said. ¶ “So the danger in this situation is that if these talks don’t go forward, we could be facing a global conflict in the coming months and years and that’s got to be avoided at all costs when you’ve got countries like the United States, Russia, and China with” their arsenals of “nuclear weapons,” he warned. ¶ The warning came one day after the White House told Congress not to impose new sanctions against Tehran because failure in talks with Iran could lead to war.

#### Negotiations are now or never – means the DA turns case before case turns the DA because waiting too long allows Iranian hardliners to scuttle negotiations

**Haass, 9/29/13** – president of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard, “A Diplomatic Dance Will Be No Waltz for Either Iran or America” Financial Times,

<http://www.cfr.org/iran/diplomatic-dance-no-waltz-either-iran-america/p31517>)//VP

We will know soon enough. Both sides are in a hurry. The new Iranian leaders worry that time is against them. They fear that conservatives defeated in the June elections will rally, while the public will grow impatient if the sanctions-battered economy does not improve. Americans worry Iran is using time to get closer to creating an infrastructure able to produce fissile material, weaponise it and put warheads on missiles. Israeli officials do not hide their belief that under Mr Rouhani Iran will "smile its way to the bomb". All of which means this diplomatic dance will be no waltz. Sooner rather than later – certainly before next year is out – we should know if we will be toasting success or managing a crisis.

#### 1) Obama will win on Iran sanctions

Sargent 12/2 Greg, Washington Post, Will Senate Dems really undermine the White House on Iran?, 12/2/13, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/12/02/will-senate-dems-really-undermine-the-white-house-on-iran/

The Washington Post reports today that Senate Dems really do appear to be forging ahead with plans to vote on new sanctions on Iran, even though the White House fears that this could undermine the prospects for a long-term deal curbing Iran’s nuclear program.¶ Administration officials are aggressively lobbying Senate Dems — including Robert Menendez and Chuck Schumer — not to hold any vote on sanctions right now, even if those sanctions would only take effect after the six month deadline of the temporary deal expires:¶ The administration contends that new sanctions not only would violate the terms of the interim agreement — which temporarily freezes Iran’s nuclear programs and modestly eases existing sanctions — but also could divide the United States from its international negotiating partners across the table from Iran and give the upper hand to Iranian hard-liners in upcoming talks.¶ “The purpose of sanctions from the outset was to create a dynamic so that you can get a change in policy from the Iran­ians,” David Cohen, the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence. said in an interview. “It’s not sanctions for the sake of having sanctions.”¶ The White House has organized a full-court press between now and the Senate’s return Dec. 9 to persuade lawmakers not to act.¶ There are a few ways I think this could play out.¶ One possibility: Harry Reid has referred the matter to the Senate Banking Committee, and the Committee could simply not act on any sanctions bill. The Committee’s chair, Senator Tim Johnson, has issued a statement that seemed sympathetic to the administration — his office said he supports a “diplomatic solution” and was “encouraged” by Obama’s announcement of a temporary deal — so it’s possible he’ll be receptive to the administration’s argument against a vote on new sanctions.¶ According to a source involved in the process, Senator Johnson is set for a private briefing next week on the Iran deal with Secretary of State John Kerry, and probably won’t make any decisions before then. “No decisions have been made,” the source says. Of course, if the committee didn’t act, there would be other ways for the Senate to pass new sanctions — such as via an amendment to a defense authorization bill — but this would make it hard for Obama to veto, and would entail Harry Reid directly bucking the administration in a very public, consequential way.¶ Another possibility: The Senate could pass a sanctions bill that is structured in a way that gives the White House the flexibility it needs. Here’s how this could work: The sanctions could be set up to kick in after the six month mark, but there could be a kind of escape hatch which allows for the sanctions to be deferred, if after the six months both sides agree a big, long term deal is within reach and want to keep talking. But hawks will loudly oppose this on the grounds that it could let Iran string the process out indefinitely.¶ A third possibility: Senate Dems could defer the vote, as per the scenario laid out by Dem Rep. and pro-Israel hawk Eliot Engel the other day. Dems would prepare a sanctions bill and threaten to vote on it if Iran is seen to be reneging on its end of the temporary bargain.¶ The last possibility, of course, is that the Senate could simply buck the administration’s request altogether and vote now on a full fledged sanctions bill that kick in after six months with no escape hatch (Obama could veto the bill, but this is a scenario the White House really doesn’t want, partly for the reasons outlined in the Post piece). This is a hard outcome to imagine. Senate Dems will insist that they are actually doing this to strengthen the administration’s position – not undermine it — by increasing the threat level associated with the failure to reach a long term deal.¶ But this is a tough case to make, given that the administration itself is asking Dems refrain from doing this, on the grounds that it could imperil the chances for a truly historic breakthrough. If it comes to this, Democrats will be asked to explain why the White House’s request for flexibility — given that it has come far enough to reach a temporary deal — is an unreasonable one.¶ If I had to guess right now, I’d say the second or third are the most likely outcomes. But there is a tremendous amount of pressure being brought to bear on Senate Dems from all sides, so the situation is very much in flux.

#### Obama PC succeeding

Dyer 11/20 Geoff, Financial Times, Obama in plea to postpone new Iran sanctions, 11/20/13, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/585195a2-516f-11e3-9651-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2lKtMLrat

Barack Obama made a personal appeal to leading senators on Tuesday to postpone new sanctions on Iran.¶ The move came on the eve of crucial nuclear talks. However, the US president still faces fierce opposition from many Republicans in Congress.¶ The US administration had initially appeared to win some political breathing space over its nuclear negotiations after a leading Republican senator left a meeting with Mr Obama and said that no new sanctions were likely until at least next month.¶ However, by the evening a group of six Republican senators not at the meeting had introduced a new sanctions measure which accused the administration of being “deeply naive” in the way it was negotiating with Iran and called for Tehran to halt all enrichment of uranium.¶ The amendment to the annual Pentagon funding bill introduced on Tuesday evening was authored by Senator Mark Kirk and was also backed by Mitch McConnell, the leader of the Republicans in the Senate.¶ Capping another day of fierce lobbying in Washington over the Iran talks and new disagreements between the US and Israel, the amendment could set up a political confrontation between the White House and its Iran critics in Congress if it is put up for debate.¶ The Obama administration has warned that new sanctions on Iran could scupper the ongoing talks with the country over its nuclear programme, which many western governments believe is designed to eventually produce a nuclear weapon.¶ The new amendment was introduced just hours before diplomats from the US and six other world powers meet senior Iranian officials in Geneva to discuss an interim agreement, which would freeze important parts of Iran’s nuclear programme in return for modest sanctions relief, in order to buy around six months to try to negotiate a long-term deal.¶ Iran will be negotiating with the US, UK, Russia, China, France and Germany.¶ US officials have said that an agreement is “close”, but 10 days ago talks broke up without a deal despite high expectations.¶ In his effort to forestall new congressional action against Iran, Mr Obama met 10 leading senators from both parties on Tuesday. Although some of the senators said they disagreed with the administration’s approach, the initial response appeared to win some respite for Mr Obama.¶ Bob Corker, the senior Republican on the foreign affairs committee who has been a big critic of the negotiations, said after the meeting that the Senate would not pick up a new sanctions bill that has already passed the House of Representatives until after the Thanksgiving holiday at the end of this month at the earliest.¶ A Senate aide added that given the short calendar in December because of the Christmas holidays, little movement was expected before January.¶ Mr Corker also said that no Iran sanctions amendments were likely to be attached to a forthcoming Pentagon funding bill, which had been mooted by some senators as another route for new punitive measures against Iran.¶ John McCain, the Arizona Republican and another regular critic of Mr Obama’s foreign policy, also said he did not expect new sanctions immediately.¶ “You always have to listen to the president of the United States when he asks you to do something,” he told the Washington Examiner. “Of course we want to seriously consider doing what he wanted, especially in the midst of some serious negotiations.”¶ However, Mr Kirk’s amendment threatens new restrictions on Iran’s ability to access overseas funds and to acquire precious metals if it does not halt all uranium enrichment – which is also one of the central demands of the Israeli government.¶ “This proposal will give our diplomats the increased leverage they need to get a good deal at the negotiating table – a deal that peacefully brings Iran into full compliance with its international obligations,” said Mr Kirk.

**A) Obama is velcro**

Walker, 11 [Jon, Fired o Lake, a news website, 12/8, Plan B Reminder: Obama Controls the Executive Branch at All Levels, ALB]

Separate from the specific issue surrounding this decision, what it does show is that the President can and will insert himself into the decision-making of executive agencies at all levels if he wants. He will get involved in even something as minor as the decision about a single drug if he thinks it will help him.¶ He is the head of the executive branch and and the responsibility for the actions of executive ultimately stops with him. This incident, like Obama’s previous decision to overrule the EPA on new smog regulations, shows that if an agency is not making the choices he wants it to make, he will take extraordinary heavy handed action to intervene to change things.¶ When executive agencies do things like stage a mutli-agency effort to harass state medical marijuana programs, it is because the President directly or indirectly approves of these actions.¶ There is no such thing as rogue agencies or significant agency policy changes that don’t have Obama’s direct or implicit approval. The executive branch works for the President. The buck stop with him. Whether you approve or disapprove of the decision federal agencies make, the ultimate blame or credit rest squarely with the President.

#### B) Congressional review act

David M. McIntosh, Chair, Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory, Affairs of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee and Former Executive Director of the Council on Competitiveness in the Bush I Administration, “Congress Must Stop Regulation Without Representation,” THE PUBLIC MANAGER: THE NEW BUREAUCRAT, June 22, 1998, LN.

**By requiring the agencies to report all new rules to Congress and giving Congress the opportunity to review and strike down bad rules, the CRA gives Congress a powerful trump card against agencies** that go too far. It could put Congress back in the driver's seat. At the same time, the CRA puts Congress in the hot seat.

#### C) Appropriations

Lovell 2K (Assistant Professor of Government, College of William and Mary, George, 17 Const. Commentary 79)

It is true that **members of Congress** do not cast "yes" or "no" votes on particular rules created by agencies, but they do quite often **need to go on record with "yes" or "no" votes that make agency activities possible. Legislators must cast votes to establish executive branch agencies and to give those agencies the authority to make regulatory decisions**. The democratic controls created by such votes weaken over time. (Most of the voters who voted for the legislators who passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act are now dead). **But members of Congress** need to take at least one **vote** per year (**on the relevant appropriations bill) in order for any regulatory program to continue**, and circumstances sometimes force members to cast additional votes on particular programs. **Since no regulatory program can operate without being created and continually authorized by Congress, there is nothing about delegation that prevents an unhappy electorate from holding members of Congress accountable for regulatory power exercised by the agencies.**

**The means all parts**

**Merriam-Websters, 8** [Online Collegiate Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary]

4 -- used as a function word before a noun or a substantivized adjective to indicate reference to a group as a whole <the elite>

**“Federal Government” is all three branches**

**Truman Library, No Date** (Harry S. Truman: Library and Museum- One of thirteen presidential libraries, “Three Branches of Government”, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/teacher_lessons/3branches/1.htm>) MaxL

Our federal government has three parts. They are the Executive, (President and about 5,000,000 workers) Legislative (Senate and House of Representatives) and Judicial (Supreme Court and lower Courts).